Posts tagged as:

property rights

The New York Times has produced a fascinating story about turf wars among the city’s food cart vendors, particularly clashes between the traditionally immigrant-run carts and trendy new arrivals. Like in DC, New York set a cap on the number of cart permits. Yet while DC’s cart scene slumped into mediocrity under the city’s burdensome regulations, entrepreneurial New Yorkers worked out their own extralegal ways to operate:

The city, other than blocking certain streets entirely and enforcing parking regulations, does not dictate locations for food carts. But spots are virtually owned by vendors who have worked them for decades; they are handed down within families and even sold on the black market. [...]

Vendors say that the traditional code of the streets may be effective, but that it feeds on fear, intimidation and the city’s lack of enforcement of permit rules.

“It only works because everyone is a little bit in the wrong, and no one is 100 percent clean,” said Mr. Lao [a new cart owner]. “We can’t go through legal channels to resolve our disputes.” Mr. Lao was referring to the notorious black market in the food vendor permits issued by the city’s Department of Health. Most of the vendors interviewed would not talk publicly about the status of their permits. But several of them, asking not to be identified because of the dubious legality of the arrangements, said they had secured theirs by paying unauthorized “fixers” or by entering into partnerships with existing permit holders. A common form of retribution among vendors is to report one another to city authorities for permit violations.

The existing system is a tribute to the spontaneous creation of norms and property rights, but it’s breaking down as outsiders jump into the cart boom. Increasing the number of legal permits and auctioning them off, as one bill proposes, would be a partial solution. Establishing legally recognized, tradeable property rights for cart locations might be another, but it doesn’t appear that anyone is talking about that.

Another significant conflict is between cart owners and owners of restaurants and cafes who resent the low-cost competition. Read the whole thing here.

Previously:
Cart watch, NYC edition
DC cart watch, public choice edition
Hot dogs and beyond

Permalink - Share/Save - Comments (3)

Teach a man to fish

by Jacob Grier on September 19, 2008

A post last week touched on assigning property rights to overcome the tragedy of the commons issue that threatens to destroy world fisheries. Today’s New York Times reports on a new study explaining how this can work. John Tierney comments:

A global survey of more than 11,000 fisheries points to a profitable system to protect fisheries from collapsing. The bad news is that this system, called catch shares, is used in only 1 percent of the world’s fisheries and is still controversial, but the researchers hope the new evidence of its success will win over some opponents — a group has included both local fishermen and some environmentalists.

Under this system, a fisherman owns the right to a certain percentage of the annual allowable catch in a fishery. These shares, sometimes called Individual Transferable Quotas, can be bought and sold on the market, and their price goes down if the fish population declines. So fishermen have a direct incentive to protect the fishery along with their investment: that way their share will be worth more when they retire and sell it to someone else.

Neither of the articles mentions how valuable these shares can be or how big an effect they have on fishermen’s willingness to enforce rules against each other. They do have other positive side effects though:

One of the authors, Steven Gaines, a marine biologist at U.C. Santa Barbara, noted that after the system went into effect for sablefish in Alaska, the fishermen used many fewer hooks and therefore reduced the “bycatch” — the incidental killing of fish of other species. The traditional system, in which the catch was limited only by the legal length of the season, had encouraged a “race to fish” as fishermen flung down as many hooks to catch as many fish as fast as they could. But the catch-share system enabled them to work at a slower, more efficient pace until they reached their guaranteed quota.

Tierney has reported previously on research suggesting that the profit-maximizing fish population under private ownership is greater than that needed for sustainability for many species of fish, giving fishermen an incentive to restrict catches.

Permalink - Share/Save - Comments (0)